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CHINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY: AN OVERALL VIEW* 
Shao-chuan Leng** 
To date, the People's Republic of China still suffers from a dis-
tinct military inferiority in relation to the superpowers. Neverthe-
less, its modest but growing nuclear-missile capabilities do constitute 
an important factor in global strategic balance and arms control 
efforts. 
This paper proposes to analyze China's nuclear policy and its 
international implications. It will begin with an examination of 
China's nuclear capability and strategic doctrine and then will fol-
low with a discussion of the Chinese position toward arms control 
and disarmament (ACD), particularly Beijing's recent role in ACD 
negotiations. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR DETERRENT 
It is a well-known fact that the PRC under Mao Zedong made 
an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons for security and prestige 
reasons, despite his frequent denouncement of the atomic bomb as a 
mere "paper tiger." A recent press report reveals how deeply the 
Chinese pride was hurt by the "Soviet betrayal" in 1959 concerning 
the sharing of atomic secrets. According to an article in the 
Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), China gave its first atomic 
bomb the code name of "596" to remember the "shameful" June of 
1959 when the "perfidious" Russians tore up a 1957 agreement to aid 
China in making the A-bomb and withdraw from China their spe-
cialists including experts in atomic energy. 1 Prompted by the Soviet 
* This is a revision of the following two papers: one presented to the 77th Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1981, and the other 
presented to the 24th Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, 
November 1982. 
** Doherty Professor of Government and Chairman for the Committee on Asian 
Studies, University of Virginia. 
I. "Where the Mushroom Clouds Rise," Jie.fangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 
July 28, 1981, p. I. For information on the Soviet withdrawal, see, among others, rele-
vant sections of Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations, New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1966; Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. _A Chinese account may be found in 
"Statement of the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," Peking Review, Vol. 6, No. 
33 (August 16, 1963), pp. 7-15. 
(1) 
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action, the Chinese went ahead to research and detonate their first 
atomic bomb successfully on October 16, 1964, all on their own ef-
fort. "Our ancient nation which has long been looked down upon by 
some foreigners," said a commentary of the Liberation Army Daily, 
"has finally accomplished something that our forefathers were un-
able to do and that some foreigners thought only they themselves 
could accomplish."2 
China's first nuclear device on October 14, 1964 was a 20 kilo-
ton (KT) atomic bomb. On June 17, 1967 the PRC successfully 
tested a 3 megaton (MT) range hydrogen bomb. Thus China 
showed "a first-rate research, development, and production capabil-
ity" by making the transition from fission to fusion in less than three 
years. 3 A Chinese author took pride in pointing out that it took 7, 5, 
and 8 years respectively for the United States, England, and France 
to achieve the same transition.4 Since 1967 more than 20 nuclear 
tests have been conducted by the PRC, ranging from tactical weap-
ons to hydrogen bombs. 5 The latest blast, amounting to between 200 
KT and 1 MT, was held on October 17, 1980.6 All told, China now 
has stockpiles of several hundred fission and fusion weapons. 
Since April 1970 the PRC has launched twelve space satellites.7 
It sent into orbit a cluster of three satellites by· a single rocket on 
September 20, 1981.8 China's twelfth satellite, launched on Septem-
ber 4, 1982, was viewed as an indication that the PRC has probably 
perfected both solid and liquid fuel technology for rocket engines.9 
According to Zhang Jun, Chinese Minister of Astronautics Industry, 
China is developing a new type of three-stage liquid-fuelled rocket 
2. "The Road to Heights," Ibid. See also David Lan. "Bomb." AFP. Hong Kong, 
July 28 1981, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China (hereinafter cited as FBIS), 
July 29, 1981, pp. Cl-C2. 
3. Harlan C. Jencks, "The Chinese Military-Industrial Complex and Defense Mod-
ernization," Asian Surve_y, Vol. 20. No. 10 (October 1980), p. 966. For details on China's 
nuclear programme to 1969, see Jonathon D. Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Toward Nu-
clear Weapons. 1964-1969," China Quarterly, No. 50 (April-June 1972). pp. 244-71. 
4. Liang Yuan, He Wuqi He He Zhan/ue (Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy). 
Hong Kong: Jisi Tushou, 1973, p. 41. 
5. For China's nuclear tests, see Appendix. Events up until the early 1970s may be 
found in one of many articles by Alice Langley Hsieh. See her "China's Nuclear-Missile 
Programme: Regional or Intercontinental," China Quarter~v. No. 45, (January-March 
1971). pp. 85-91. 
6. FBIS, October 17, 1980, p. Ll. 
7. For early developments, see Hsieh. "Regional," supra note 5, pp. 91-94. 
8. UPI, Beijing, September 22, 1981. 
9. See Michael Weisskopf, "China Planning Major Satellite Launch." Washington 
Post, February 17, 1983, p. A32. 
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to launch a geo-stationary satellite and a big near-earth orbital satel-
lite in the days to come. 10 
In terms of its strategic missiles deployed, China possesses about 
50 medium-range ballistic missiles, MRBM's (CSS-1), with a range 
of 1,100 km, 65-85 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, IRBM's 
(CSS-2), with a range of 2,700 to 5,600 km, 4 multi-stage interconti-
nental ballistic missiles, ICBM's (CSS-3), with a limited range of 
6,000-7,000 km, and 4 full-range ICBM's (CSS-4), with a range of 
13,000 km. 11 The successful test of a full-range ICBM in May 1980 
demonstrated the impressive progress of the Chinese nuclear-missile 
program and the potential of Chinese missiles to reach any site in the 
Soviet Union as well as the West Coast of the United States. 12 
In addition, China has some 90 TU-16 medium strategic bomb-
ers with a radius of action up to 3,000 km. It also test-fired in Octo-
ber 1982 its first submarine-launched missile from a nuclear-
powered submarine, making the PRC only the fifth country to have 
successfully developed an SLBM. 13 
On balance, the Chinese nuclear force has been improving 
steadily but its value as a viable deterrent is still arguable. Although 
widely dispersed, China's missiles currently operational are mainly 
liquid-fuelled, thus vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. In order to 
reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear deterrent, Beijing can be ex-
pected to continue an effort to develop a mobile land-based, 
seaborne or airborne strategic force. 
CHINA'S CHANGING STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 
The official doctrine that has shaped the PRC's military strategy 
and tactics in the last three decades is Mao's doctrine of "people's 
10. Zhu Ling, "Space Age Technology Enters New Phase," China Daily, July 17, 
1983, p. I. 
II. The Military Balance, 1981-1982, London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1981, pp. 72-73; also The Military Balance, 1982-1983, pp. 79-80. 
12. AP, Beijing, May 18, 1980; "Pentagon Sees Chinese Missile as a Threat to So-
viet," New York Times, May 22, 1980, p. A6; Leo Y.Y. Liu, "The Modernization of the 
Chinese Military," Current History, Vol. 79, No. 458 (September 1980), p. 38; Dinah Lee, 
"Newcomer in the ICBM Club," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 108, No. 25 (June 
13, 1980), pp. 41-42. Early events are to be found among others in Hsieh, "Regional," 
supra note 5, pp. 91, 94-97. 
13. New York Times, October 17, 1982, p. 15; X!NHUA, Beijing, October 16, 1982. 
A recent review of naval modernization in China can be found in Richard Breeze, "The 
Wild Blue Yonder," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 116, No. 24 (June II, 1982), pp. 
21-26. 
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war." 14 With a special emphasis on political indoctrination and mo-
bilization of the masses, it seeks to compensate for China's inferi-
ority in weaponry by maximum use of manpower and revolutionary 
tactics. As a defense plan against a technologically superior enemy, 
it advocates a protracted war waged by the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) with support of some 100 million militia forces to over-
whelm the invader. 
Thus far, Beijing has not made public any well-defined nuclear 
strategy but appears to have adopted the concept of minimum deter-
rence. 15 To counteract the Soviet threat and pressure in recent years, 
14. Some previous studies on the subject are: Stuart R. Schram, "The Military 
Deviation of Mao Tse-tung," Problemsoj'Communism, Vol. 13, No. I (Jan.-Feb. 1964), 
pp. 49-56; Samuel B. Griffith, "The Glorious Military Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-
tung," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42 (July 1964), pp. 669-74; Benjamin Schwartz, "On the 
'Originality' of Mao Tse-tung," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No. l (Oct. 1955), pp. 67-76; 
Raymond L. Garthoff, "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy," Foreign A.f-
.fairs, Vol. 40, No.4 (July 1962), pp. 566-575; Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism 
and the Rise o.f Mao, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. 189-204; Stuart R. 
Schram, "The Military Principles of Mao Tse-tung," in his The Political Thought o.f Mao 
Tse-tung, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969, pp. 265-293; William W. Whitson, The 
Chinese High Command, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 458-497; William W. 
Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's, New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1972, pp. 269-386; Jaques Guillermax, "The Soldier," in Dick Wilson, ed., 
Mao Tse-tung in the Scales o.f History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 
pp. 117-143; Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation o.f Maoist 
Revolutionary Strategy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 52-153; Harold 
Hinton, "Political Aspects of Military Power and Policy in Communist China," in Harry 
L. Coles, ed., Total War and Cold War, Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1959, pp. 266-
292; Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, "Chinese Communist Insurgent War-
fare, 1935-49," Politico,' Science Quarterly, Vol. 81, No.2 (June 1966), pp. 171-195; Ed-
ward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao 
Tse-tung," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 70, No.3 (Sep. 1955), pp. 321-340. Relevant 
sections of the following works may also be consulted: Dick Wilson, The People's Em-
peror, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1980; Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese 
People's Liberation Army, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969; Jerome 
Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, London: Oxford University Press, 1965; Stuart 
Schram, Mao Tse-tung, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967; F.F. Liu, A Military His-
tory o.f Modern China 1924-49, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956; Ying-mao 
Kau, The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation Building, White Plains, N.Y.: In-
ternational Arts and Science Press, 1973; Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Mod-
ernization in the 1980's," China Quarterly, No. 90 (June 1982), pp. 231-52; King C. Chen, 
China's War Against Vietnam, 1979: A Mi!liary Analysis, Baltimore, MD: University of 
Maryland School of Law (Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian 
Studies, No.5, 1983 (58)). Mao's words on the subject are to be found in Selected Mili-
tary Wrtiings o.f Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967). 
15. Harry Gelber, Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy, Adelphi Papers, no. 99, 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973, p. 19; Lawrence Freedman, 
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the Chinese have pursued the policy of continuing the development 
of a nuclear deterrent on the one hand, and emphasizing the defen-
sive strategy of "people's war" on the other. They may expect that 
the announced determination to fight protracted defensive war, 
along with China's prudent external posture and pledge not to use 
the bomb first, will minimize the danger of a preventive attack. In 
fact, Beijing's establishment of an American connection and its cur-
rent efforts to form an international united front against "hegemon-
ism" are also part of its overall strategy to improve national security 
and to gain time for further nuclear development. 16 
In the context of China's drive toward modernization, there 
seems to be a consensus among the Chinese elite on the need to 
modernize China's armed forces. Nevertheless, a debate is continu-
ing about the pace, nature, and means of this modernization. Illus-
trative is the fact that despite the recent reorganization of leadership 
structure the plan to restore military ranks is yet to be implemented. 
Still, the move is under way in the PRC to upgrade its national 
defense. 17 
While continuing to pay lip service to the concept of "people's 
war," Chinese leaders now call for the modernization of strategy and 
weapons to meet the changing nature of warfare. "In the present 
stage in which science and technology is developing by leaps and 
bounds," Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian wrote in 1978, "we shall 
be the subject to attack if we do not master all the weapons as well as 
the struggle tactics and methods which the enemy already possesses 
or may possess." 18 In an article written in 1981, the late Deputy 
The West and Modernization of China, Chatham House Papers no. I, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1979, p. 8. 
16. For a discussion of current Chinese efforts, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "Chinese 
Global Strategy and Soviet Power," Problems of Communism, Vol. 30, No. I (January-
February 1981), pp. 54-69. 
17. Recent works on military modernization in China include among others: Kau, 
supra note 14; Robinson, supra note 14; Angus M. Fraser, "Military Modernization in 
China," Problems of Communism, Vol. 28, No. 5 (Sep.-Dec. 1979), pp. 34-49; David L. 
Shambaugh, "China's Quest for Military Modernization," Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 5 
(May-June 1979), pp. 295-309; Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Defense Dilemma: The 
Modernization Crisis of 1976 and 1977," Contemporary China, Vol. 2, No.3 (Fall 1978), 
pp. 63-85; Francis J. Romance, "Modernization of China's Armed Forces," Asian Survey, 
Vol. 20, No.3 (March 1980). pp. 298-310; Edward N. Luttwak, "Problems of Military 
Modernization for Mainland China," Issues and Studies, Vol. 14, No. 7 (July 1978), pp. 
53-65, also appeared in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. I (May 1979), pp. 3-
16. 
18. Xu Xiangqian, "Heighten Vigilance and Prepare for War," Hongqi (Red Flag), 
No. 8 (1978), p. 48. 
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Chief of Staff of the PLA Yang Yong described Mao Zedong's mili-
tary though as still the guideline for army building and warfare to-
day. It must be studied, however, with a scientific attitude of 
"seeking truth from facts" and "with the realities of our army and 
the demands of modern warfare in mind." Only by scientifically 
drawing upon both Chinese and foreign experiences and by continu-
ously seeking progress and improvement, he said, can the Chinese 
army be sure of success in its modernization and in any future war 
against aggression. 19 
In a commentary dated January 15, 1983, the Liberation Army 
Daily described the strategic policy of the PLA as one of "active 
defense." Since military campaigns against Vietnam, the commen-
tary said, the PLA has "streamlined its training procedures, focusing 
on organization of different services to fight in coordination under 
modern conditions." It also "has paid particular attention to foreign 
armies and modern wars, examined the requirement of actual com-
bat, and outlined tactics. to defeat an army with superior 
equipment."20 
The PLA's move in the direction of modernization and of revis-
ing its strategy and tactics was underscored by recent military exer-
cises. In 1981 a large-scale coordinated combat exercise took place 
in North China (near Zhangjiakou), involving ground and air 
forces. 21 In 1982 a joint PLA maneuver was conducted in Ningxia, 
involving the assumed use of tactical nuclear weapons.22 
As a part of the overall picture, the Chinese appear to be start-
ing the reassessment of their strategic thinking in the nuclear field. 
Beijing's successful test of a full-range ICBM in May 1980, for in-
stance, has been viewed by some observers as a sign that the Chinese 
strategy is moving from a minimum deterrence against one super-
power to a more balanced two-pronged deterrence policy.23 To be 
19. Yang Yong, "Uphold the Scientific Attitude of Seeking Truth From Facts-
Writing for the Commemoration of the 54th PLA Founding Anniversary," Renmin 
Ribao (People's Daily), August I, 1981, p. 2. 
20. XINHUA, Beijing, January 15, 1983. 
21. New York Times, September 27, 1981, p. 8; FBIS, September 28, 1981. pp. Kl-
K3. 
22. New York Times, July 14, 1982, p. 3. 
23. See Gerald Segal, "China's Strategic Posture and the Great Power Triangle," 
Pacific Affairs (Winter 1980-81), pp. 682-697. In this regard, see also "China's Strategic 
Position," Beijing Review, Vol. 24, No. 10 (March 9, 1981), p. 3; Cheah Cheng Hye, 
"Bridging the Strategic Gap," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 108, No. 18 (April 25, 
1980), pp. 30, 32; "Gambling on a Quick Missile Deterrent," Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, Vol. 109, No. 40 (September 26, 1980), pp. 55-56; Michael Weisskopf, "China's 
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sure, the shift may not be so dramatic or imminent, for the Chinese 
have continued to picture the ICBM test as an important contribu-
tion to the cause of "international struggle against hegemonism."24 
However, the development of Chinese ICBM force will doubtedly 
enable Beijing to adopt a more flexible and independent strategic 
posture relative to Washington's policy. In this regard, there is a 
striking similarity between Chinese and French positions. Compara-
ble to France in nuclear capability, the PRC is showing increasing 
interest in the complexities of nuclear strategy in general and the 
French decision to manufacture the neutron bomb and the role of 
tactical nuclear weapons in particular.25 Commenting on the French 
situation, the Beijing Review says: 
France has spent some 53,600 million U.S. dollars since 
1960 to develop nuclear arms. Still, compared to the nu-
clear arsenals of the superpowers, France's is rather insig-
nificant and it is this that has led French military experts to 
redesign their national defense to current realities. Here 
the research and manufacture of the neutron bomb figures 
prominently.26 
The implications of Chinese current interest in tactical nuclear 
weapons, the simulated use of which was reported in the 1982 
Ningxia military exercise, suggest that notwithstanding its "no-first-
use" pledge, the PRC may conceivably contemplate the compelled 
use of tactical nuclear weapons against superior invading forces in 
the name of self-defense. 
CHINESE POLICY TOWARD ARMS CONTROL AND 
DISARMAMENT 
The PRC's perception of security interest and the international 
balance of force has conditioned its stand on ACD issues. For years 
the Chinese have consistently advocated total nuclear disarmament 
and opposed the Superpowers' efforts to limited arms controP7 The 
Defense Chief Calls for Emphasis on Nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, March 4, 
1983, p. Al7; Michael Weisskopf, "China Stresses Defensive Aim of Nuclear Force," 
Washington Post, July 28, 1983, p. AS. 
24. "Warmly Hail the Successful Launching of Carrier Rockets," Jie.fangjun Bao, 
May 22, 1980, p. I. 
25. "Nuclear Weapons and Defense Policy," The China Quarterly. No. 84 (December 
1980), pp. 829-830. 
26. "The French Neutron Bomb," Beijing Review, Vol. 23, No. 33 (August 18, 1980), 
p. 8. 
27. Shao-chuan Leng, "Arms Control and Disarmament in Chinese Global Policy," 
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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, for example, have been denounced 
by Beijing as a "sham." According to Chinese spokesmen, the 
SALT agreements have actually permitted a fierce nuclear arms race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and particularly 
enabled the latter to speed up the development of new and even 
more sophisticated strategic weapons.28 
China has been and remains opposed to the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty (PTBT), the proposed comprehensive test ban treaty, and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Time and again, the Chinese have 
argued that these treaties are deceptive traps designed by the super-
powers to disarm non-nuclear powers and that neither China nor 
other "peace-loving" countries should accept their restrictions.29 
Chinese development of nuclear weapons has been justified as neces-
sary for self-defense and the elimination of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear 
duopoly and blackmail. In every announcement of Chinese nuclear 
testing since 1964, the PRC has repeated the pledge that "it will 
never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nu-
clear weapons" and has challenged the other nuclear powers, espe-
cially the superpowers, to do the same.30 
The PRC has also refused to join the other superpower-sup-
ported agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty, the Sea-Bed 
Treaties, the Convention Banning Biological Warfare, and the Con-
vention on Environmental Warfare, even though it has no quarrel 
with the basic ideas of these treaties and has often found its negative 
stand contrary to the wishes of the majority in the UN General As-
sembly.31 By the same token, Beijing has objected to the convening 
of a world disarmament conference repeatedly proposed by the So-
viet Union unless certain conditions are met. First, the prerequisites 
for the conference are a no-first-use pledge by all nuclear countries, 
particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the 
withdrawal by the superpowers of all their armed forces, including 
their nuclear missile forces, from abroad. Second, the aim of the 
in China in the Global Community, James C. Hsiung and SamuelS. Kim, eds., New York: 
Praeger, 1980, pp. 165-172. 
28. "SALT Agreement," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 22 (June I, 1979), pp. 22-23; Si 
Mada, "Waltz in Vienna," Renmin Ribao, June 24, 1979, p. 6. 
29. "China at the United Nations," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 51 (December 17, 
1971), pp. 19-20; Susan Warren, China's Voice in the United Nations, New York: World 
Winds Press, 1975, pp. 75-88. 
30. For the Chinese government's statement announcing the first nuclear detonation 
on October 16, 1964, see Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Pe-
king: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 1-5. 
31. Leng, supra note 27, pp. 169, 179. 
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conference should be the complete prohibition and thorough de-
struction of nuclear weapons. 32 According to the report of a UN Ad 
Hoc Committee in 1982, China and France continued to hold the 
view that the convening of any world disarmament conference 
"would serve no practical purpose in the present international polit-
ical climate."33 
Despite China's opposition to the superpower-sponsored arms 
control measures, it has been positive in approaching some other 
ACD matters. The PRC has signed the treaty of Tlateloco to honor 
the Latin American nuclear-free zone. It is on record in favor of the 
establishment of nuclear-free zones or peace zones in Asia, the Pa-
cific, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Central 
Europe, and Africa.34 In spite of their public opposition to the NPT, 
the Chinese have tacitly followed a nonproliferation policy. There is 
no evidence that China has aided any country in nuclear develop-
ment.35 Recent reports about China's "nuclear trade" with South 
Africa and Pakistan's "planned nuclear tests on Chinese territory" 
have been strongly denied by Beijing and Islamabad respectively.36 
All things considered, the PRC's interests cannot conceivably be 
served by nuclear proliferation, especially if Taiwan and South Ko-
rea acquire nuclear weapons. 
In an apparent attempt to woo Third World countries, Beijing 
has shown in recent years more flexibility in its ACD posture. This 
was evidenced by the Chinese participation in the Tenth Special Ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 at the 
initiative of the nonaligned countries. The Special Session revital-
ized as the deliberative body on ACD issues the Disarmament Com-
mission to be composed of all UN members. It also replaced the 
Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) with 
an enlarged Committee on Disarmament (CD) as the new negotiat-
ing body for global disarmament, composed of all five nuclear states 
and 35 non-nuclear stages.37 
32. Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua at the Plenary Meeting of the 28th Session of the UN 
General Assembly, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973, p. 24; "Speech by Huang 
Hua, Chairman of Chinese Delegation," Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 41 (October 7, 
1977), p. 39; "Varying Degrees of Support for World Disarmament Conference Re-
ported," UN Monthly Chronicle, October 1978, p. 31. 
33. "Disarmament Efforts Continue," UN Chronicle, October 1982, p. 78. 
34. Leng,supra note 27, pp. 170-174. 
35. SIPRI Yearhook-1981 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1981), p. 302. 
36. FBIS, July 29, 1981, p. Cl; and FBIS, December 10, 1980, p. F4. 
37. SamuelS. Kim, "Chinese Global Policy: An Assessment," in Hsiung and Kim, 
supra note 27, pp. 235-236. 
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To the UN Disarmament Commission, the Chinese delegation 
put forward in May 1979 a "comprehensive programme of disarma-. 
ment." One novel feature of the Chinese plan was the call for super-
powers to begin immediately reducing and destroying their nuclear 
armaments by stages: 
When substantial progress has been made in the destruc-
tion of their nuclear weapons, thus closing the huge gap 
between their nuclear arsenals and those of the other nu-
clear states to the satisfaction of the majority of states, the 
other nuclear states shall then join them in negotiation for 
the total destruction of nuclear weapons. 
Departing from China's past policy, the present plan also attached 
equal importance to the reduction of conventional armaments and 
asked the Soviet Union and the United States to be the first to 
greatly reduce their conventional arsenals. Again only "when sub-
stantial progress has been made in this regard, the other militarily 
significant states shall join them in reducing conventional arma-
ments according to reasonable ratios." 
A number of other points presented in the Chinese programme 
were obviously designed to appeal to the Third World. The follow-
ing may be cited as examples. The actual process of disarmament 
"should benefit the economic and social development of states." No 
denuclearization agreement should deprive non-nuclear states of 
"their right to use nuclear energy and develop their nuclear indus-
tries for peaceful purposes." The organization and procedures of the 
disarmament machinery "should be free from superpower manipula-
tion and control and should fully reflect the demands and wishes of 
all states in the world." The role of the United Nations in disarma-
ment was given a special endorsement by the Chinese plan: 
The UN General Assembly shall be kept informed of pro-
gress in all bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotia-
tions. All parties to disarmament negotiations should 
earnestly consider and respect the recommendations and 
calls made by the General Assembly. 
Finally, the Chinese plan included the total prohibition and destruc-
tion of all chemical and biological weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction and a reiteration of Beijing's previous proposals for 
the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops, the dismantling of foreign military bases, and the undertak-
ing by all nuclear powers, particularly the Soviet Union and the 
United States, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
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non-nuclear states.38 
In June 1982 Huang Hua, China's Foreign Minister and Chair-
man· of the Chinese Delegation, expounded the PRC position on the 
disarmament issue in a speech before the Second Special Session of 
the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. He blamed the super-
powers for the lack of any real progress in disarmament since 1978, 
pointing out that they "are not all sincere about disarmament and 
have instead stepped up arms expansion." He then reiterated several 
points China had made before, i.e., the superpowers must reduce 
their arms first, conventional and nuclear disarmament should be 
carried out simultaneously, all states should participate in disarma-
ment negotiations on an equal footing, etc.39 
Four measures were outlined in the disarmament proposal 
Huang and his delegation presented to the UN General Assembly. 
First,· all nuclear states should reach an agreement on the non-use of 
nuclear weapons. Pending this, they should undertake uncondition-
ally not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nu-
clear-free zones and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against 
each other. Second, the Soviet Union and the United States should 
stop testing, improving, or manufacturing nuclear weapons and re-
duce by 50 percent all types of their nuclear weapons and means of 
delivery. Thereafter, China would join all other nuclear states in un-
dertaking to stop the development and production of nuclear weap-
ons and to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals according to 
agreed levels and procedures. Third, to move towards conventional 
disarmament at the same time, all countries should undertake not to 
use conventional forces for armed intervention or agression and 
must withdraw troops from foreign soil immediately. The super-
powers again should take the lead in substantially reducing their con-
ventional forces. Only after this would China and other major 
powers join in conventional disarmament. Fourth, chemical weap-
ons and other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited.40 
In spite of repeating many of China's old themes, the 1982 pro-
posal nonetheless contained something new. For the first time the 
PRC committed itself to engage in actual nuclear arms control ar-
rangements after a 50 percent nuclear arms reduction by the Soviet 
Union and the United States. China also proposed an international 
38. Text of the Chinese proposed plan in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 22 (June I, 
1979), pp. 17-18. 
39. Text of Huang's speech China and the World (Beijing: Beijing Review. 1982). 
Vol. 2, pp. 5-78. 
40. For the text, see Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 28 (July 12, 1982), p. II. 
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verification group be established to monitor the implementation of 
disarmament measures and to report to the UN General Assembly.41 
There have been other manifestations in recent years of Beij-
ing's increasingly active role in ACD matters. Early in 1980 the 
PRC participated for the first time, as a regular member, in the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Chinese delegates there 
have continued to expound China's well-known stand on a number 
of ACD issues and to blame the superpowers, especially the Soviet 
Union, for intensifying international tensions and creating obstacles 
for disarmament negotiations.42 Since 1980 the PRC has also joined 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space. 
As said in its national paper, "China is ready to play an active role in 
this international organization, and, together with other countries, 
will strive to make a continuing contribution to the exploration and 
peaceful use of outer space."43 In both the Committee on Disarma-
ment and the Legal Sub-committee of the Committee on the Peace-
ful Use of Outer Space, Chinese representatives have stressed the 
need for adopting measures to prevent the militarization of outer 
space, including elaborating internationa1law on the issue.44 
Even more significantly, the PRC lately is making a noticeable 
shift from its strong objection to any inspection of Chinese nuclear 
facilities by foreign powers or international groups like the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. According to both Chinese and 
American sources, good progress has been made between Beijing 
and Washington over a cooperation agreement in the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy.45 Under such an agreement inspection would be re-
quired by American law to ensure that nuclear material and high 
technology exported to China from the U.S. is used solely for civil-
ian purposes. Furthermore, the PRC is currently in the process of 
entering negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
to discuss China's entry into this UN affiliated body whose purpose 
is to develop peaceful use of the atom and to prevent its diversion 
into military channels. Along with this, Beijing is also reportedly 
prepared to take other steps to comply with international norms in 
41. Ibid. 
42. UN Doc. CD/PV. 105 (February 12, 1981), pp. 17-20; XINHUA, Geneva, Au-
gust 4, 1981. 
43. UN Doc. A/CONF. 101/AB/13 (June 16, 1981), p. 3. 
44. The China Quarterly, No. 90 (June 1982), p. 358. 
45. XINHUA, Washington, July 14, 1983; Don Oberdorfer, "Arms Sale of$250 Mil-
lion Set for Taiwan," The Washington Post, July 16, 1983, p. Al5. 
CHINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY 13 
the nuclear area.46 
While continuing to abstain from voting on UN resolutions for 
stopping nuclear tests,47 the PRC has been showing an increasing 
interest in the worldwide anti-nuclear, peace movement. Speaking 
before the UN General Assembly in 1982, Huang Hua said, 
In recent years the people of Europe, Japan, the United 
States and elsewhere have launched a mass movement 
against the nuclear arms race of the two superpowers and 
for preventing nuclear war. We fully understand and sym-
pathize with their concern for peace and for the prevention 
of war.48 
Acknowledging the presence of divergent and complex forces behind 
the peace and anti-nuclear movement, a Hongqi (Red Flag) author 
nevertheless contended in a 1983 article that "on the whole, the mass 
movement reflects the people's just desire for peace and resentment 
against war, with their main efforts directed at the United States and 
the Soviet Union who are responsible for intensifying the arms 
race."49 
CONCLUSION 
As noted in the preceding pages, China's nuclear policy regard-
ing both weapon development and arms control has consistently 
aimed at the improvement of its unfavorable position in the existing 
military balance. Its current strategic imperative remains to be the 
deterrence of the Soviet Union through individual and joint interna-
tional efforts. 
To some observers, Beijing's disarmament plan makes good 
sense in the context of its nuclear position.50 To others, certain Chi-
nese ACD propositions appear self-righteous and contradictory. 
Cited as an example for criticism is Beijing's contention that Chinese 
nuclear weapons work toward peace, while those of the superpowers, 
particularly the Soviet Union, work toward war.51 
46. Michael Weisskopf, "China Stresses Defensive in Nuclear Buildup," Ibid., July 
28, 1983, p. A5; Oberdorfer, supra note 45. 
47. See, for example, SIPRI Yearbook 1981, pp. 394-395; SIPRI Yearbook 1982, p. 
465. 
48. China and the World, Vol. 2, p. 7. 
49. Si Chu, "International Struggle Over Disarmanent and China's Stand," Hongqi, 
No. 4 ( 1983), p. 38. 
50. Amos Yoder, "Chinese Policies Toward Limiting Nuclear Weapons," The Stan-
ley Foundation Occasional Paper, No. 22 (March 1980), p. 25. 
51. Kim, supra note 37, p. 230. 
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Be that as it may, the present trend indicates that the Chinese 
are showing a greater interest in ACD matters while continuing the 
drive for a credible nuclear deterrent. Given its growing strategic 
capability and increasing interactions with the Third World coun-
tries, before too long the PRC may conceivably ease or abandon its 
opposition to the superpower-sponsored but UN-supported arms 
control measures and become actively as well as seriously engaged in 
major international ACD negotations. After all, confronted with 
economic and technological constraints, the Chinese should know 
that their long-term interest lies not in a costly and dangerous arms 
race but in staged and realistic denuclearization leading to an even-
tual sharp reduction if not elimination of nuclear weapons by all 
powers. Much, however, still depends upon the superpowers to lead 
the way in showing bold statesmanship in the global politics of 
disarmaments. 
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APPENDIX 
CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTS 
Date Yield Delivery S~stem Test Site Warhead 
I. l0/16/64 20KT Ground (tower) Lop Nor Fission device 
2. 5/14/65 40KT Air (TU-4) Lop Nor Fission 
3. 5/09/66 300KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Fission 
4. 10/27/66 30KT Missile (SS-4 Shwangchentze Fission 
IRBM) to Lop Nor 
5. 12/28/66 500KT Ground (tower) Lop Nor Fission 
6. 6/17/67 3MT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
7. 12/24/67 25KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor N.A 
8. 12/27/68 3MT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
9. 9/22/69 25KT Underground Lop Nor Fission device 
10. 9/29/69 3MT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
II. 10/14/70 3MT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
12. 11/18/71 20KT Ground (tower) Lop Nor Tactical warhead 
13. l/07/72 Under Ground (tower) Lop Nor Tactical warhead 
20KT 
14. 3/18/72 200KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Atomic warhead 
15. 6/27/73 2MT+ Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
16. 6/17/74 500MT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Tactical weapon 
17. 10/27/75 200KT Underground Lop Nor Fission 
18. 1/23/76 200KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor N.A. 
19. 9/26/76 200KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Tactical weapon 
20. 10/17/76 200KT Underground Lop Nor Tactical weapon 
21. 11/17/76 4MT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
22. 9/17/77 20KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Fission 
23. 3/15/78 20KT Ground (tower) Lop Nor Fission 
24. 10/14/78 50KT Underground Lop Nor Fission 
25. 12/14/78 20KT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Tactical weapon 
26. 10/16/80 IMT Air (TU-16) Lop Nor Thermonuclear 
warhead 
Sources: Ray Bonds (ed.), The Chinese War Machine (New York: Crescent, 1979), p. 
174; 
Agatha S.Y. Wong-Fraser, "China's Nuclear Deterrent," Current History, 
September 1981, p. 246; 
Stockholm International Peace Research International Yearbook 1981, pp. 374, 
382. 
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